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Brighty Ann Sarah
18 March 2025 |
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On 23 February, the election results in Germany were released, with the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU), emerging victorious, amassing 28.6 per cent. Amidst a struggling economy, rising of anti-immigration among the public, and administrative disarray, the collapse of the ‘traffic-light coalition’, led by Germany’s former Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Social Democratic Party (SPD)was imminent.
However, the true element of concern was the sharp rise in the vote share garnered by the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), largely labeled as an extremist organization, currently under investigation by various authorities, including the German domestic intelligence agency, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV). AfD emerged second in the race with a striking 20.8 per cent vote.
To say that AfD is the first and only evidence of the rise of right-wing extremism and political polarization in the country would be considered inaccurate since neither had quite gone away. With its formation in 2013, AfD is the most recent, yet the strongest manifestation of the ever-present extremism and ethnonationalism in Germany, the stark victory of the AfD at the polls is not merely a matter of the party’s growing prevalence, it is the reflection of a larger problem that has shaped German society, particularly the former German Democratic Republic (GDR).
While the evils have always simmered beneath the surface, East Germany has historically been a stronghold of such extremist movements. The reasons for the flourishing of radical right-wing movements and ideologies in the eastern provinces are multifaceted, and shaped by historical, economic, developmental, and psychological factors.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the reunification of both territories was hastened. After nearly four decades of political isolation, and economic and development constraints under the Soviet Union. The reunification was meant to be the rise of East Germany into socio-economic growth in comparison with the Western counterpart. Although measures were adopted towards this goal, the degree of its success is questionable. Policies including the Trust Agency (Treuhandanstalt) and Solidarity Surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) fundamentally destabilized the East German economy.
With the clear economic disparity between the two regions, it reflected in the slow economic growth, rising unemployment rates, and wealth disparity between the populations has been the major cause for the rise of right-wing populism and anti-establishment inclinations in the region. East Germany also experiences a persistent problem of internal migration due to income and employment inequity, which leaves the region’s population aging and shrinking.
Over the years, a fraction of the East German population has felt that the reunification was merely the assimilation of East Germany into the more affluent West, rather than true integration as equals. East Germans harbor a feeling of being ‘left behind’ and treated as ‘second-class citizens’, and the escalating ‘brain drain’ from the region in pursuit of better economic opportunities in the West, only adds to their concerns. Berlin remains the cultural hub of the region, while the other states are among the poorest in the country.
Germany’s far-right ethno-nationalist spirit which had been subdued by the Second World War was also on the steady rise, spurred on by the open-door policy under Angela Merkel during the European refugee crisis. East Germany remains unrelenting in its hostilities towards immigrants, the roots of which lay in its communist past. While West Germany grew more heterogeneous with the influx of immigrants in the 1970s and 80s, East Germany had remained largely ethnically homogenous, with a history of violent attacks against immigrants dating back as early as the 1920s. AfD fed on this fear of cultural erosion, and loss of opportunities to immigrants amidst the already struggling economy.
Additionally, the growing support towards right-wing extremism is an act of protest by the East German population who feel alienated from the ‘elitist’ mainstream politics. The 2017 German election brought forth the consensus that two-thirds of all AfD voters choose the party more as an act of protest, rather than in acceptance of their objectives. The growing radical movements have successfully capitalized on this mounting frustration and helplessness.
In hindsight, the East Germans show leniency towards extremism, and the West German’s affiliation to centrist political beliefs is pivoted in their historical experiences. The well-founded economic and industrial base also keeps the Western provinces less radical. The East German bitterness toward government policies and reduced benefits, an unchecked history of extreme nationalism, and alienation continue to enable the right-wing expansion in the East.
About the author
Brighty Ann Sarah is a student at Department of International Studies, Stella Maris College, Chennai
