CW Note
A Militant attack in J&K:
India-Pakistan Tensions
Conflict Weekly #278&279, 1 May 2025, Vol.6, No. 17 & 18
|
D Suba Chandran
5 May 2025 |
The following note was published as a part of IPRI Conflict Weekly
In the news
On 22 April, militants belonging to the Resistance Front (TRF) opened fire in Pahalgam in Kashmir Valley in J&K, on tourists from the rest of India, killing 26. India’s Cabinet Committee on Security met on the same day, and decided to hold the Indus Water Treaty in abeyance, closed the India-Pakistan border crossing point at Attari, cancelled visas issued to Pakistani nationals, declared military advisers in Pakistan’s High Commission in New Delhi as persona non grata, and withdrew its own defence personal from Islamabad. The CCS meeting also decided to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice and hold their sponsors to account.
On 24 April, Pakistan convened its National Security Committee to respond to India’s actions. The meeting decided to consider unilateral suspension of the Indus Water Treaty as an act of war, to suspend all bilateral agreements (including Simla), to close its side of the border crossing at Wagah, to cancel visas to Indians, and to close the air space for Indian airlines.
On 25 April, in a press statement, the UN Security Council “strongly condemned” the terrorist attack and “stressed that the perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors must be held accountable and brought to justice.” Pakistan’s Prime Minister stated that his country “is open to participating in any neutral, transparent, and credible investigation,” but warned that “any attempt to stop, reduce, or divert the flow of water belonging to Pakistan under the Indus River Treaty would be responded to with full force and might.”
On 28 April, the Hindu quoted an Indian army official referring to the Pakistan army initiating small arms fire across the Line of Control (LoC) during 26-27 April and the Indian army responding to the same. Ever since, there have been regular skirmishes between the two armies across the LoC. On 29 April, Dawn quoted Pakistan’s military spokesman, accusing India of activating its assets to intensify terrorist attacks in Pakistan.
On 30 April, the Hindu quoted the Indian Prime Minister having complete operational freedom to the Indian armed forces to decide on mode, target and timing of the Indian response. On 1 May, Dawn quoted Pakistan’s deputy prime minister saying the following: “Pakistan will not be the first one to resort to any escalatory move; however, in case of any escalatory move by the Indian side, we will respond very strongly,” and “any misadventure will be responded to in a befitting and decisive manner at the time and place of our choosing.”
Issues at large
First, declining militant attacks since 2019 and increasing tourism and investments in J&K. During the last ten years, major militant attacks in J&K have declined drastically. While there were minor attacks (according to data published by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there were 72 and 61 casualties during 2023 and 2024, respectively), the last major attack was in 2019 in Pulwama. Correspondingly, tourism in J&K was picking up, along with other economic activities, including investments, underlining the return of normalcy to the region.
Second, the emergence of the Resistance Force (TRF). Considered as an offshoot of the Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), a terrorist group based in Pakistan which is globally recognised and designated accordingly, TRF came into being in 2019 in J&K. India banned TRF in 2023; according to media reports in reputed newspapers, TRF was targeting non-Kashmiris and also religious minorities within J&K.
Third, India-Pakistan tensions, and Islamabad’s fear over India unilaterally withdrawing from the Indus Water Treaty. During recent years, New Delhi has adopted a tough posture towards Pakistan and has kept the bilateral relations to a minimal, and also has taken measures within J&K (including the abrogation of Article 370 and removal of the statehood in 2019). Pakistan has been wanting India to normalize relations and undo the changes New Delhi has made in J&K. Both at the state and civil society levels, Pakistan has been apprehensive of India unilaterally ending its commitment to the Indus Water Treaty, which remains its only river system. Pakistan’s agriculture and economy are dependent on the Indus river system.
Fourth, the limited role/influence of external actors. While the UN Security Council has condemned the terrorist attack in J&K, and other major countries from the US to Middle East have called for de-escalation, their influence on India and Pakistan have been minimal, especially relating to J&K. While Pakistan has been attempting to bring the international actors to address the bilateral issues with India, the latter has resisted them.
In perspective
First, the cyclic nature of tensions in India-Pakistan relations, triggered by militant groups. Post-Kargil War, during the recent decades, the bilateral tensions were all triggered by militant activities either with a base in Pakistan, or linked with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Toiba. From the militant attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, militant groups and their activities in India (both within J&K and outside) have been the primary trigger of the bilateral tensions.
Second, India’s decision to suspend the Indus Water Treaty as a punitive measure creates an existential alarm in Pakistan. Supported by the World Bank and signed by India and Pakistan in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty has withstood the three wars and multiple escalations until now, primarily because India has not violated it. Indus river system being Pakistan’s lifeline, Islamabad fears New Delhi walking away from it would be a big blow, than any bilateral military confrontation. Hence, Pakistan wants India to respect it, and the latter wants to use it as a punitive measure against the former from supporting militant groups.
