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D Suba Chandran
15 May 2025 |
Conflict Weekly # 280-81, 15 May 2025, Vol 6, No.s 19 & 20
The following note was published as a part of IPRI Conflict Weekly
In the news
On 10 May, India and Pakistan agreed to stop military actions. India’s External Affairs Minister said: “India and Pakistan have today worked out an understanding on the stoppage of firing and military action. India has consistently maintained a firm and uncompromising stance against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It will continue to do so.” On 12 May, the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMOs) of India and Pakistan held a meeting to implement the understanding.
On 12 May, the Indian Prime Minister in his address to the nation, underlined the establishment of a “new normal” in counter terrorism measures. He also stated: “Talks and terror cannot go together, terror and trade cannot go together, and water and blood cannot go together.”
On 13 May, Pakistan confirmed the killing of 40 civilians and 11 armed forces personnel during India’s attacks over nine targets in Pakistan and PoK. On 14 May, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, in his address to the troops, said: “You have taken revenge for the 1971 war...and now the whole nation is standing with you,” and warned India: “If you again attack us, you will lose everything…We are ready for war and dialogue. Now the choice is yours.”
On 13 May, the US President repeated his claims that his administration played a role in brokering a “historic ceasefire” between India and Pakistan, to “stop the escalating violence between India and Pakistan.” While Pakistan welcomed the US role, India repeated its position that “any issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir have to be addressed by India and Pakistan bilaterally.”
Issues at large
First, a brief note on the terror attack in J&K, which led to the military confrontation between India and Pakistan. On 22 April, a terror attack in Pahalgam, a tourist attraction in J&K, witnessed the massacre of civilians, mostly tourists from the rest of India. The Resistance Front (TRF), believed to be linked with Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba, initially claimed the attack. The terror attack attracted global condemnation, including a statement from the UN Security Council.
Second, terror attacks in J&K, leading to India-Pakistan tensions. Following the terrible attacks in Mumbai by terror groups based in Pakistan during 2008, there were terrorist attacks in J&K during 2016 and 2019, which resulted in a strong reaction by India. In September 2016, following a terrorist attack in Uri in J&K, India launched surgical strikes. In February 2019, following a terrorist attack in Pulwama in J&K that killed 40 Indian para-military officials, India responded with air-strikes. During 2016 and 2019, India responded to terrorist attacks by targeting terror camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).
Third, Operation Sindhoor and the latest tension between India and Pakistan. Following the terrorist attack in Pahalgam in J&K, New Delhi downgraded the diplomatic and economic relations with Pakistan and closed the Attari border. Islamabad took similar measures against India. On 7 May, India launched a military operation with precise targeting of nine places in Pakistan and Pok, belonging to Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Toiba – two terrorist organizations that were primarily responsible for terror attacks in India. On 10 May, Pakistan launched a military operation Bunyan Marsoos and claims to have targeted Indian military targets along the India-Pakistan border.
Fourth, the ceasefire along LoC and the role of DGMOs. Ever since the establishment of a comprehensive ceasefire in 2003 by India and Pakistan, the Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of the two militaries played an important role in addressing cross-LoC firings and violations. Although established much before the 2003 ceasefire, the DGMOs-level communication is a strong tool to convey violations and discuss at the local level between the two militaries.
Fifth, the role of external mediation. While Trump has repeatedly taken credit for de-escalating the tensions between India and Pakistan, New Delhi and Islamabad have different approaches towards external mediation. While Islamabad wants external mediation and “internationalization” of bilateral issues, New Delhi emphasizes bilateral negotiations between India and Pakistan to address all contentious bilateral issues.
In perspective
First, the “new normal” between India and Pakistan during the last ten years. While there were escalations during 2016, 2019, and now in 2025, there were political tensions between India and Pakistan that continued. Terrorist attacks, escalation and de-escalation have become a new normal between the two countries.
Second, terrorist attacks in India by Pakistan based groups as a trigger for military tensions between the two countries. From the terror attacks in Mumbai in 2018 to Pahalgam in 2025, the terrorist attacks have either resulted in the collapse of a normalization process (before the Mumbai attack, India and Pakistan pursued a normalization process that witnessed significant development between the two countries and across two parts of Kashmir) or fuelling the political tensions into a military escalation. Both Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are listed as terrorist organizations across the world – from the US to the UN. While Pakistan claims to face an existential threat from terrorism, its (in)actions in controlling the activities of the above two in India act as the primary factor, triggering bilateral escalation.
