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Lekshmi MK
15 May 2025 |
Conflict Weekly # 280-81, 15 May 2025, Vol 6, No.s 19 & 20
In the news
On 12 May, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) declared disarmament and the end of its insurgency. Reuters quoted the PKK’s statement: “The PKK 12th Congress decided to dissolve the PKK's organizational structure... and end the armed struggle.”
On 12 May, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan welcomed the announcement, and said: "With terror and violence being completely disengaged, the doors of a new era in every area, namely strengthening politics and democratic capacity, will be opened.”
On 12 May, UN Secretary-General António Guterres welcomed the PKK's announcement. The UN Secretary-General spokesperson, Stéphane Dujarric, stated: “The Secretary-General welcomes the news of the decision of the PKK to dissolve and disarm. This decision, if implemented, represents another important step towards the peaceful resolution of a long-standing conflict.”
Issues at large
First, the Kurdish question in the Middle East and Turkey. Kurds are an ethnic group residing across southeastern Turkey, northern Syria, northern Iraq and northwestern Iran. Their population is distributed 14.7 million in Turkey, 8.1 million in Iran, 5.5 million in Iraq and 1.7 million in Syria. The issue goes back to the end of the First World War. Despite a promise by Britain and France of a Kurdish state after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, they went back with the formation of modern-day Turkey with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. Subsequently, despite their large demographic composition, Kurds became divided in different countries and formed an ethnic minority in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran and Armenia. Kurdish protests and movements led to the Sheikh Rebellion and the Dersim Rebellion (1937-38) in Turkey, the Anfal Campaign in Iraq during the late 1980s, and the shortlived Republic of Mahabad in Iran in 1946. All of them were suppressed.
Second, the rise of the Kurdish insurgency and the emergence of the PKK. In Turkey, years of violent suppression resulted in a radical section led by Abdullah Ocalan to form the PKK in 1978, calling for an independent Kurdish state. It became an insurgent group in 1984, and the insurgency expanded from southeastern Turkey to northern Iraq and Syria. By the 1990s, more than 40,000 people were killed, and Turkey, the US and the EU listed the PKK as a terrorist organisation. Following Ocalan’s arrest in 1999, the PKK declared multiple unilateral ceasefires during the 2000s and gradually shifted its demand from full independence to political autonomy. A series of ceasefires and peace processes collapsed during 2010 and 2015. According to the UN, the renewed fighting during 2015-2020 claimed over 5,000 lives and displaced nearly 500,000 people, especially in southeastern Turkey. Since 2020, Turkey has conducted over 30 cross-border military operations against the PKK in northern Iraq and Syria.
Third, Ocalan-Erdogan negotiations. Since 2020, Turkey’s intensified military operations pushed the PKK towards the Iraqi border, weakening their domestic presence. In October 2024, Erdogan’s coalition partner, Devlet Bahçeli, proposed granting Abdullah Ocalan parole if the PKK ends violence and dissolves. This was also a strategy to secure support from the pro-Kurdish People's Equality and Democratic Party (DEM) for a constitutional change allowing Erdogan to remain in power beyond 2028. Ocalan’s appeal for disarmament was influenced by these offers and the realisation that achieving the PKK’s objective through military means is unfeasible. Besides, Syria’s administrative change, which benefited the PKK (The Assad regime pulled out from Kurdish-majority areas of Kobane, Afrin, and Qamishli in northern Syria) and Iran’s vulnerability after Israeli strikes further isolated the PKK.
In perspective
First, Ocalan's strategic recalibration. Ocalan recognised the futility of continuing armed conflict against overwhelming military pressure. The decision implies a pragmatic act, balancing external military pressure with the capacity of the movement. The move would likely secure a parole, political autonomy, and inclusivity through peaceful means.
Second, Erdogan’s plan to hold on to power. Erdogan's role in the PKK disbandment is likely to receive widespread public appraisal. By projecting himself as a peace negotiator on the Kurdish issue, Erdogan aims to gain support domestically and internationally, especially ahead of elections. This incremental strategy allows gradual control over Kurdish political movements while maintaining a facade of reconciliation. Ultimately, it is less about resolving the Kurds' question and more about reinforcing Erdogan’s long-term hold on power.
Third, the PKK's pivot from insurgency to legitimacy. The PKK's move to abandon armed struggle is not only a tactical withdrawal but a rebalancing. This rebalancing also raises questions on the prospective acceptance of the PKK as a peaceful political voice by the Turkish government and the public.
