|
Deb Dutta
5 July 2026 |
What happened?
During 01–03 July, Japan’s PM Sanae Takaichi, took part in the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit held in New Delhi. She met with PM Narendra Modi to review bilateral cooperation and discuss regional and global issues. The summit was followed by Modi's visit to Tokyo in August 2025.
During the summit, three major joint statements have been signed on Economic Security, Artificial Intelligence, and Energy Resilience focusing on strengthening supply chain resilience, advancing cooperation in emerging technologies and AI governance, and enhancing collaboration on clean energy, energy transition, and resilient energy systems.
Additionally, 129 Memoranda of Understanding signed by the two countries at an Economic Forum that was held along with the summit. More than 150 Japanese firms attended this forum, including Suzuki, Itochu, and Toyota Tsusho.
What is the background?
1. A brief note on India-Japan relations
The India-Japan relationship has evolved steadily over the years since their civil nuclear cooperation agreement in 2015. In 2016, India and Japan had inaugurated the India-Japan Act East Forum that focused on building connectivity in India’s Northeast region. Japan is the single largest provider of Official Development Assistance to India, and this includes concessionary loans for building the Mumbai-Ahmedabad bullet train. This meeting follows up on the Joint Vision for the Next Decade that was signed at the 15th summit in Tokyo in August last year.
2. Growing emphasis on economic security
The growing emphasis on economic security roadmap are driven by specific challenges that have arisen recently. The challenge regarding the fragility of global supply chains for semiconductors and critical minerals was clear during the pandemic and growing geopolitical tensions. China's monopoly on the processing of rare earth minerals, together with the ability of this country to apply export restrictions in political interests, has made it necessary for the two countries to look for another source of raw materials. In the case of Japan, India is an option, seen as an alternative source of workers and production facilities. For India, cooperation with Japan helps the country obtain investments and advanced technologies to produce semiconductors. The lack of chips in 2021-2023 demonstrated the threat of having a limited number of foreign partners.
3. Expanding cooperation in Artificial Intelligence and emerging technologies
This cooperation reflects pressures on both sides. Japan's shrinking working-age population has created a shortage of skilled technology workers, while India has one of the world's largest pools of engineers and software talent. Global competition in AI is intensifying, led mainly by the United States and China, and this is pushing middle powers like Japan and India to pool resources rather than depend entirely on either. Working together also allows both countries a greater say in shaping AI governance standards, instead of simply adopting rules set by larger powers.
4. Evolving partnership in energy transition and resilient clean energy
Such collaboration is driven by common exposure to energy shocks. Importing a lot of energy in the form of oil and gas exposes both countries to the dangers of Middle Eastern instability and the Strait of Hormuz. Recent events in the Middle East highlight this vulnerability as well as how fast energy prices could go up. Climate-related promises also force both countries to move away from fossil fuel-based energy towards energy diversity. Japan is a good partner because of its capital investment and technological advances in nuclear energy and other sources of clean energy. India’s advantages in this regard include the potential of scale in renewable and hydrogen-based energy projects.
What does it mean?
First, economic security, technology, and energy become the core pillars of the relationship. The visit shows these factors as core pillars and not side topics. Cooperation is moving from general goodwill toward concrete joint initiatives, seen in the three joint statements and the scale of Japanese business participation at the summit. Japan is now treating India as a strategic and economic partner, not simply an aid recipient.
Second, China remains the unspoken subject of this summit. Much of the push behind economic security and energy resilience comes from a shared wish to reduce dependence on China, whether for rare earths, semiconductors, or energy routes. Yet neither side named China directly in their statements. This shows both countries want to hedge against China without provoking it, keeping the partnership deliberately ambiguous on this point.
Third, doubts about the Quad's future may be pushing Japan to invest more in this one-on-one relationship. The Trump administration has taken a more transactional approach toward China. This has raised questions about how committed the US remains to countering Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Growing bilateral cooperation in technology and energy suggests Japan now sees its direct partnership with India as more reliable and durable than the wider Quad grouping.
