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Madhura Meenakshi Tanikella
17 July 2026 |
In the news
On 08 July, President Trump declared that the US-Iran ceasefire was “over,” after clashes broke out between the two countries following Tehran’s strikes against tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, and Washington’s retaliatory strikes on 07 July. Additionally, the US reinstated previously lifted oil-related sanctions on Iran.
On 10 July, Trump said, “The Islamic Republic of Iran has asked us to continue ‘talks’”; Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman denied that new negotiations had been requested.
On 11 July, the IRGC said that the Strait of Hormuz was closed.
On 12 July, US Central Command (CENTCOM) refuted that the Strait was closed, saying, “Iran does not control the strait. Traffic is flowing.”
On 13 July, President Trump said the US would take over the Strait of Hormuz and that it should be reimbursed for controlling and providing protection of the waterway at a rate of 20 per cent on all cargo shipped.
On 14 July, President Trump said he had decided to scrap the 20 per cent toll, but would continue to blockade Iran’s ports. Additionally, Trump stated to Fox News that the US and Iran held talks despite attacks.
On 15 July, Trump threatened to expand US strikes on Iran in the upcoming weeks if Tehran does not agree to a deal amid a continuing dispute over the Strait of Hormuz; “Next week it gets really bad for them because next week comes the power plants. Next week comes the bridges,” he said.
Beyond these developments, the US and Iran exchanged multiple strikes between 07 and 15 July.
Issues at large
1. The collapse of the MoU
The memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, however tentative, has effectively unravelled. The agreement established the following provisions: IAEA supervision, termination of “all types” of sanctions, termination of military operations on all fronts, removal of the US naval blockade, and the safe passage of commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz. This structure offered each side relative gains: Washington gained oversight of Iran's nuclear programme, and Tehran secured economic relief. Measured against this baseline, all provisions of the MoU have been violated or left unfulfilled. Additionally, Trump's explicit declaration that the ceasefire was "over” and the sustained intensification of hostilities over the week further illustrate the MoU’s collapse.
2. Renewed escalation
Beyond the collapse of the MoU's individual provisions, the week is characterised by renewed escalations on the ground. Strikes moved from targeted exchanges to near-daily confrontations, with both sides reporting attacks on dozens of targets. The strikes by the US have focused on Iran’s air defence systems, coastal radar sites, and missile and drone capabilities, focusing on southern, eastern, and coastal provinces. Iran's strikes have extended to US military assets and defence infrastructure in Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, and Qatar, as well as any “unauthorised” vessels in the Strait of Hormuz. Unlike the post-MoU violation on 27 June, where the ceasefire persisted nominally, alongside sporadic strikes regarding the Strait of Hormuz, this week is marked by sustained and intensifying exchanges.
3. Confrontation over the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait has displaced the nuclear question as the conflict’s central point of contestation. Nuclear inspections, the conflict’s focal point once the MoU was signed, do not drive the confrontation; the renewed cycle of strikes instead traces to Iran's attack on commercial vessels in Hormuz on 07 July, with the conflict organised around control of the waterway and the flow of traffic through it. Iran's subsequent closure of the Strait and Washington's decision to enforce a blockade of Iran’s ports and coastal areas represent a regression in the conflict. Additionally, both parties are asserting competing claims over the energy corridor: CENTCOM's assertion that "traffic is flowing" through Hormuz, against Iran's claim of having closed it, exemplify the increasing contention over the Strait.
In perspective
First, the memorandum of understanding, which was already fragile, does not seem to hold in any meaningful manner, with nearly all its provisions violated. Additionally, the conflict appears to have reverted to a pre-MoU context of contradictory statements, strikes on US military bases in the Gulf by Iran, strikes on Iran’s defence capabilities by the US, tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, a US naval blockade and threats to civilian infrastructure. The week’s developments highlight that the conflict has essentially reverted to a new square one.
Second, the Strait of Hormuz occupies the centre of contestation again. The renewed escalation tied to Iran’s attacks on vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and the subsequent imposition of a naval blockade by the US, closure of the Strait by Iran, and proposed levies on cargo travelling through the Strait – all demonstrate the reiteration of Hormuz as a determining element of the conflict.
Third, given the week's developments, the conflict appears likely to persist rather than move toward resolution. Trump's repeated assertions that Iran has sought talks, denied by Iran’s Foreign Ministry, alongside his claim that talks were held even as strikes continued, against a backdrop of intensifying strikes, make a de-escalation difficult to anticipate or ascertain.
