|
Urja R Kudalkar
30 September 2026 |
Who are the militant groups in Iraq?
The Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) formed in June 2014 when PM Nouri al-Maliki institutionalized Shia militias after Sistani's fatwa against ISIS's (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) capture of Mosul. Badr is oldest founded 1982 in Iran as SCIRI's (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq) armed wing, built from Iraqi POWs (Prisoners of War)/exiles, effectively an IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps) unit through the Iran-Iraq War. Kataib Hezbollah was founded 2007 directly by the IRGC under Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq split from Sadr's Mahdi Army in 2006 under Qais al-Khazali. Harakat al-Nujaba emerged 2013 as an AAH/KH channel for Syria deployments. Peshmerga trace to decades-old KDP/PUK (Kurdistan Democratic Party and The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) resistance, formalized post-1991. Exiled Iranian Kurdish parties KDPI (Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran), PJAK, Komala, PAK, Khabat relocated to Iraqi Kurdistan over decades, allying in February 2026. ISIS traces from al-Qaeda in Iraq (2004) to its 2014 caliphate, defeated territorially by 2017.
Popular mobilization forces led the fight against ISIS from 2014-2019, but many grew beyond the goals: Badr ran a sectarian anti-Sunni campaign (2004–06) and built ministry patronage; Kataib Hezbollah mastered rockets/drones against U.S. forces (2024 al-Asad strike); AAH launched 6,000+ attacks pre-2011 then rebranded politically while staying armed; Nujaba fought for Assad in Syria and was implicated in the 2019 killing of Iraqi protesters. Along the Anbar-Syria border, roughly 20 militia-run posts smuggle oil, fuel, weapons, and drugs. Peshmerga defended Kurdish territory, clashing with Baghdad/PMF after the 2017 referendum. Exiled Iranian Kurdish parties historically ran cross-border raids into Iran, now mostly absorb Iranian strikes. ISIS governed a proto state with its own bureaucracy at its peak, now runs a dispersed insurgency of bombings and ambushes.
Badr, Kataib Hezbollah, AAH and Nujaba are Shia Islamist and Khomeinist, loyal to Iran's Supreme Leader — Nujaba being the most ideologically committed "Axis of Resistance" actor. The broader PMF also includes smaller Sunni, Christian, Yazidi and Turkmen support units. The Peshmerga and exiled Iranian Kurdish parties are ethnically Kurdish nationalist rather than sectarian, organized around self-determination rather than pan-Shia solidarity. ISIS is Sunni Arab jihadist-Salafist at its core, drawing international foreign fighters, while in Iraq exploiting Sunni grievances against both the state and PMF abuses.
Where do they operate?
Badr dominates Basra, Diyala, Kirkuk and Nineveh; Kataib Hezbollah holds Jurf al-Sakhr and the Anbar-Syria border; AAH controls northern Salah al-Din; Nujaba is based in Samarra with historical reach into Deir ez-Zor/Raqqa. Border militias cluster around al-Qaim–Albu Kamal. Peshmerga operate across Erbil, Sulaymaniyah and Duhok, extending into disputed Kirkuk. Exiled Iranian Kurdish factions sit in KRG-controlled mountain areas of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah under Erbil's jurisdiction, not Baghdad's. ISIS remnants hide in remote terrain: the Hamrin mountains and the Jazeera desert spanning Anbar, Salah al-Din and Kirkuk, plus Syrian border zones.
Role of state, non-state and external actors
Iran's IRGC-Quds Force is the common patron for Badr, Kataib Hezbollah, AAH and Nujaba, providing money, training, weapons and direction; Lebanese Hezbollah supports Nujaba specifically. The U.S. counters via FTO designations, sanctions, and troop drawdowns from Ain al-Asad and Syria (2025–26) that shift the security burden onto Iraqi and Kurdish forces. Iraq's federal government under PM Ali al-Zaidi (since May 2026) is pushing PMF integration into unified state command, with mixed compliance. The KRG manages the Peshmerga and hosts the exiled Iranian Kurdish parties, putting it in direct conflict with Iran, which struck their camps hundreds of times during the February–June 2026 war and is pressing Baghdad to enforce a 2023 disarmament pact complicated by KRG rather than federal jurisdiction. ISIS remnants are fought primarily by Iraq's CTS, with PMF and Peshmerga in supporting but sometimes counterproductive roles.
What is their endgame?
The PMF is undergoing contested partial restructuring, not dissolution: AAH, Kataib Imam Ali, and Saraya al-Salam have moved toward state command, while Kataib Hezbollah, Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada reject disarmament leaving Iraq's arms monopoly unresolved. The Peshmerga face a real crossroads as the coalition's combat mission winds down by September 2026: unification odds are estimated at 70–80%, but Baghdad could absorb its funding and control if Erbil-Baghdad talks fail. The exiled Iranian Kurdish factions face the reverse pressure sustained Iranian military and diplomatic campaigns aiming to eliminate them, leaving their survival on Iraqi soil an open question. ISIS remains territorially defeated but durable underground, with real resurgence risk as the U.S. completes withdrawal from Iraq and Syria by end-2026, particularly where post-Assad Syrian authorities prioritize other rivals over counter-ISIS operations.
References
“Iraq,” congress.gov, 08 June 2026
https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF10404.html
“What is the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq?,” Britannica, 29 July 2026
https://www.britannica.com/question/What-is-the-Popular-Mobilization-Forces-PMF-in-Iraq
“The Leadership and Purpose of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces,” Understanding the war Org
https://understandingwar.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/The20Leadership20and20Purpose20of20IraqE28099s20Popular20Mobilization20Forces.pdf
"Iran’s Shadow Army: The PMF’s Growing Influence in Iraq,” CSAG Strategy paper, 30 April 2025.
https://nesa-center.org/csag-strategy-paper-irans-shadow-army-the-pmfs-growing-influence-in-iraq/
“Instability in Iraq,” Global Conflict Tracker, 03 August 2026
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/political-instability-iraq
