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NIAS Global Politics Team
18 October 2026 |
Three Years after the 7 October Attacks: Hamas, Gaza, Israel and the Future of Palestine
An interview with Dr Stanly Johny, International Affairs Editor, The Hindu
By Akshath Kaimal, Brighty Ann Sarah, Kumari Gargi, Lekshmi MK, Manikranth Chakravarthula, Masoomi Santosh Nevgi, Preetha Renganarayanan and Samraksha Mukund
On 10 October 2026, the NIAS Global Politics team interviewed Stanly Johny, International Affairs Editor at The Hindu, marking three years since the 7 October 2023 attacks. Titled “Three Years after the 7 October Attacks: Hamas, Gaza, Israel and the Future of Palestine,” the interview examined the prospects for a ceasefire, governance and reconstruction in Gaza, Hamas’s future, and the feasibility of disarmament and Israeli withdrawal. It also explored the prospects for Palestinian self-determination, the challenges to a political settlement, Israel’s evolving international relations, and the wider regional implications of the conflict, including the US-Iran confrontation and the role of regional powers.
Akshath Kaimal:
Israel rejected the Board of Peace’s 15-point roadmap for Gaza in August. Can the Board implement any of its policies without being in agreement with Israel? And are there any countermeasures in case Israel violates these policies in the future?
Dr Stanly Johny:
The proposed 15-point plan cannot be implemented without Israel’s agreement, particularly because the Israeli government has repeatedly continued military operations in Gaza and Lebanon despite ceasefire commitments. The central obstacle is Israel’s unwillingness to withdraw from Gaza, which is a key condition for Hamas to demobilise. Although Hamas has indicated a willingness to do so in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal, the current government’s coalition makes such an agreement unlikely. The Likud-led coalition includes right-wing, religious nationalist, and other parties that oppose withdrawing from Gaza, leaving little political room for compromise.
A change in government could, however, create an opportunity for progress. Recent opinion polls suggest that opposition figures, including Yair Lapid, Benny Gantz and Naftali Bennett, could potentially challenge Netanyahu’s coalition, although none necessarily supports a permanent resolution to the Palestinian question. A post-Netanyahu government would nevertheless face two pressing challenges: rebuilding Israel’s damaged international relationships, particularly with the United States, and determining how to govern Gaza after the destruction of around 80 per cent of the territory. With approximately 2.3 million Palestinians facing dire humanitarian conditions and Israel confronting allegations of genocide, continued military occupation would be difficult to sustain politically, legally, and morally.
Consequently, a future Israeli government might be more willing to negotiate an arrangement concerning Gaza, potentially creating the conditions for implementing the proposed plan and securing a ceasefire. However, such an agreement would not necessarily resolve the broader Palestinian question on statehood and autonomy or deliver a lasting peace. The immediate prospect for progress depends largely on whether Israel’s political leadership changes its approach to withdrawal, Hamas’s demobilisation, and the future governance of Gaza.
Lekshmi MK:
Even if the current conflict comes to an end, the question of who governs Gaza remains unresolved. Given Israel’s opposition to Hamas retaining power, the limitations of the Palestinian Authority, and the challenges faced by the proposed Board of Peace, what realistic governance arrangement could emerge in Gaza?
Dr Stanly Johny:
The key question is whether Israel would take over the whole of Gaza or withdraw its troops as part of the proposed plan. The withdrawal of Israeli troops remains a major sticking point. Hamas has agreed to withdraw its forces and give up heavy weapons, but the question is whether Israel would also pull back its troops or continue to maintain its military presence in Gaza, effectively preserving the status quo. One possibility is the establishment of a technocratic government to administer Gaza. However, the continued presence of Israeli troops and Hamas’s disarmament remain the main obstacles to implementing the plan.
Preetha Renganarayanan:
In your assessment, what is the most favourable outcome that Gaza can realistically hope to achieve? What minimum conditions would Israel and the Palestinians need to accept to make such an outcome viable?
Dr Stanly Johny:
There is no optimistic scenario for Gaza. However, as a first step, the most favourable outcome would involve an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, followed by the establishment of a non-Hamas administration.
Following October 7 attacks, Hamas has arguably lost its legitimacy to continue governing Gaza, a consequence that Hamas itself acknowledges. Hamas is also unlikely to dissolve itself, given that Israel has failed to destroy the organisation. It will continue to survive, evolve into a different political entity, or potentially continue armed resistance if Israeli troops remain in Gaza. However, Hamas's ability to continue ruling Gaza has been called into serious question. Hamas also recognises this reality and is prepared to relinquish power in the enclave.
For the Palestinians living in Gaza to find any form of consolation, a non-Hamas Palestinian administration is necessary. Gaza cannot remain under Israeli military occupation, nor can a technocratic administration simply be imposed on the Palestinians by the Board of Peace, as such an arrangement would lack legitimacy. Instead, governance must be entrusted to a Palestinian-led, non-Hamas government that also has Hamas's support, given that Hamas is a political movement with deep roots among Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. The objective would be to keep Hamas out of power and establish a new, Palestinian-led administration for Gaza.
For this government to function, two imperatives must be met. First, it requires the support of the international community. This is also why the administration should be non-Hamas. An administration led by Hamas is unlikely to receive international support for two reasons. First, Hamas has been designated a terrorist organisation by the United States, the European Union, and several other countries. Second, following Hamas's October 7 attack, it would be difficult for Western countries and even countries in West Asia to publicly support or provide financial assistance to a Hamas administration. Therefore, keeping Hamas out of power is also a practical necessity. International support must be secured for the new Palestinian government, which would then initiate reconstruction activities. This would help the Palestinians displaced by the war, who constitute almost 100 per cent of Gaza's population, return to their homes and regain at least some semblance of normality.
The second imperative is the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza. Thousands of Israeli troops remain in the enclave, having destroyed approximately 70 per cent of Gaza. The entire northern part of Gaza has been flattened. In April 2024, six months into the war, Israeli sources had indicated that not a single building remained standing in northern Gaza, particularly in Gaza City. This illustrates the scale of destruction and the need to rebuild the enclave.
Gaza requires a government with international backing and reconstruction funding, but these efforts also depend on Israel ending its military presence in the enclave. If the Israeli military occupation continues, none of the elements of this plan will work. Hamas will not relinquish power or surrender its weapons, while Israel will continue bombing Hamas positions. Hamas, in turn, will continue fighting back with whatever resources it retains. The conflict will therefore persist, leaving the people of Gaza without peace or stability. These conditions concern not even the broader question of Palestine, but only the immediate circumstances of Palestinians living in Gaza. If the current status quo continues, they will never achieve any meaningful degree of peace or stability in the enclave.
Therefore, three elements are essential to any plan that seeks to provide the Palestinians with immediate relief from their present suffering. First, Israeli troops must withdraw from Gaza. Second, Hamas must relinquish power. Third, a Palestinian government with international backing must assume responsibility for governing Gaza and initiating reconstruction and rehabilitation activities.
Brighty Ann Sarah:
In the context of the relentless and escalating Israeli violence, has the conflict reached the point of a ‘forever war'? Further, how has Israel's relationship with the world evolved in the three years since 07 October?
Dr Stanly Johny:
The conflict currently appears to be a ‘forever war,’ driven by two developments. First, the situation in Gaza and Israel’s reluctance to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Second, Israel’s simultaneous tightening of the occupation in the West Bank, the appropriation of Palestinian land, and the violence unleashed by settlers. The Israeli parliament has passed a resolution on applying Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank. Violence has become the norm in the territory, where the occupation continues alongside the expansion of settlements and settler violence. Gaza remains largely under military occupation, while the West Bank faces an intensification of existing occupation.
The Israeli political discourse also reflects a lack of appetite for pursuing a political solution. Particularly after 7 October, the Israeli psyche and polity have shifted to the right. Opinion polls indicate that almost 80 per cent of Israeli voters support expelling Palestinians from Gaza, a development that is deeply concerning. Haaretz has repeatedly reported on this trend. The Israeli public also shows little appetite for a political settlement, as 7 October is widely regarded as a watershed moment after which peace with the Palestinians is perceived to be impossible. The situation in both Gaza and the West Bank therefore suggests that the ‘forever war’ is likely to continue.
However, the Israelis will eventually have to consider whether these conflicts are providing them with security. The objectives of destroying Hamas and dismantling Hezbollah have not been achieved. Although Hezbollah might have been weakened, it has survived as a militia, a political organisation, and a political movement in Lebanon. It continues to target Israeli troops, leaving the Hezbollah question unresolved. There is also a clear connection between the events of 7 October, those of 28 February 2026, and the subsequent war with Iran. Israel and the United States entered the conflict with Iran with the objective of bringing down the regime. The expectation was that the collapse of the Iranian government would alter the balance of power in West Asia and leave the various militias without their principal backer, making it easier for Israel to confront them individually. However, the Iranian regime did not collapse. It is also highly likely that the regime could reassert itself more forcefully in the Persian Gulf region, representing a major setback for Israel. The central question, therefore, is whether the ‘forever war’ is delivering any meaningful security for Israel.
The second point concern international public opinion and Israel. Although there is a perception that Israel is indifferent to international public opinion, the sustainability of this position remains uncertain. Within the United States, sections of the right wing, including members of the Republican Party, are turning against Israel. Republican senators and congressmen have accused Israel of committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. These criticisms have also come from figures such as Tucker Carlson, a prominent right-wing podcaster, who has accused Israel of committing genocide and drawing the United States into war. The left flank of the Democratic Party has long questioned America's special relationship with Israel, but such questions are now emerging from the right as well.
Across Europe, Israel's war is immensely unpopular, and Israel is also extremely unpopular in the Global South. Governments will eventually have to respond to public opinion and reconsider their existing relationships with Israel. Israel's ability to sustain its current course of action, however, rests on its special relationship with the United States, which provides military, political, diplomatic, and financial support. If this relationship comes under strain, Israel, a small country in West Asia surrounded by a hostile regional environment, will have to consider alternative options.
Israel believes that it can continue fighting this war without settling the Palestine question or addressing the conflicts in which it is involved. However, this approach is unlikely to be sustainable in the long run. Israel will have to confront the harsher reality that the wars it is fighting are not delivering long-term security. Unless this realisation takes hold, a feasible outcome is unlikely. At present, the conflict appears likely to continue as a ‘forever conflict.’
Kumari Gargi:
Israel effectively controls about two-thirds of Gaza. Does that mean that this is a temporary solution or a permanent state of affairs?
Dr Stanly Johny:
There are two perspectives on this question. From a security perspective, the Israeli military seeks to create a buffer zone between Gaza and Israel to protect Israel from attacks such as the one carried out by Hamas on 7 October. This buffer zone would be designated a security zone. Israel has previously attempted to establish a buffer zone with Lebanon but was unable to achieve this objective. It is now attempting to create a similar buffer zone in Gaza.
From a political perspective, particularly that of the Israeli right wing, the entirety of historical Palestine is considered to belong to the Jewish people. However, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Gaza are considered Palestinian territories under United Nations Resolution 247. In 2005, Israeli troops and settlers withdrew from Gaza, but following 7 October 2023, Israeli forces re-entered the territory. The Religious Zionist Party and its allies seek to take control of Gaza, expel the Palestinians, advance towards the Sinai Peninsula, and resettle Gaza with Israeli citizens. In the West Bank, approximately 500,000 Jewish settlers reside in the territory, while another 300,000 Jewish settlers live in East Jerusalem. In total, around 800,000 Israeli citizens live in the Palestinian West Bank and East Jerusalem. Until 2005, approximately 10,000 Jewish settlers also lived in Gaza.
Both perspectives suggest that the current arrangement is not a temporary solution. From a security perspective, Israel seeks to establish a buffer zone, while from a political perspective, the objective is to take control of Gaza.
Kumari Gargi:
What does Hamas mean in the contemporary world: a resistance movement, a party, or merely trying to survive?
Dr Stanly Johny:
Hamas will continue to be considered a resistance force in the contemporary world. Hamas acknowledges that it cannot sustain its hold on power and is prepared to relinquish its weapons and power on the condition that Israeli troops withdraw completely from Gaza. As long as the Israeli military continues to operate in the enclave, Hamas will remain a resistance force and is likely to continue to exist even if a Palestinian-led government is established in Gaza in the future.
The Israeli army has attempted to dismantle Hamas but has been unsuccessful in achieving this objective. Moreover, Palestinians have been forced to move to southern Gaza, where approximately 2.3 million people live amid dust and rubble. The continued Israeli bombardment and the conditions in Gaza will enable Hamas to exist.
Masoomi Santosh Nevgi:
You noted that if the Eisenkot coalition wins, the government could reach an agreement on Gaza but not on Palestine. Can the two issues realistically be separated? Trump’s 20-point plan itself conditionally links Gaza’s future to a pathway towards Palestinian self-determination. Would the Arab states, on whose support the plan relies, accept a Gaza-only settlement?
Dr Stanly Johny:
Finding a solution to the Palestinian question is fraught with pessimism, as there is insufficient ground to advance such a solution in the current scenario. The immediate priority of the Trump administration, the broader international community, and the Arab world is Gaza, given the scale of death and destruction. Gaza is a small strip of approximately 320 square kilometres that was already overcrowded. Its 2.3 million people have now been pushed into roughly 30 per cent of the territory. They lack shelter, sanitation, water, food, functional hospitals, and schools. Consequently, Gaza no longer functions as a society, which is precisely what Israel seeks to achieve. The situation in Gaza is unsustainable, forcing even the Trump administration to propose a framework to restore some degree of normality to the enclave.
The Palestinians, however, remain unwilling to leave Gaza because they fear that they would never be able to return. They are therefore holding on to whatever remains available to them in southern Gaza. With the onset of winter and the coming rains, there is also a risk of another cholera epidemic. United Nations operations in Gaza remain constrained, as movement into and out of the enclave requires Israeli approval, with all checkpoints now under Israeli control. This situation is clearly unsustainable.
Consequently, the international community is pressing for a humanitarian solution or some form of relief from the conditions facing Palestinians in Gaza. Trump may propose solutions that could, among other things, lead to a broader resolution of the Palestine question. However, such an outcome is not feasible under the present circumstances, as no Israeli politician would be willing to take that political risk.
Israel may be able to reach an agreement on Gaza because such an arrangement could facilitate its reintegration into the international community. Ultimately, the Gaza question must be addressed in one way or another. If Israel is unable to expel the Palestinians from Gaza, it will have to find a way to coexist with them. As the occupying power, Israel bears responsibility for the situation in the enclave. It will therefore have to reconsider its approach towards Gaza. The Palestine question, however, remains extremely unpopular as a subject for a negotiated settlement, even among the Israeli public.
The Palestine question also involves several structural challenges. The first concerns the capital of a future Palestinian state, followed by the determination of its borders. The status of the refugees displaced in 1948, when the State of Israel was established, remains a serious dilemma. The final issue concerns the status of Jewish settlers living in the West Bank, particularly when the government depends on the support of settler parties to remain in power. In the forthcoming election, Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are expected to win approximately 10 to 12 seats between them, representing around 10 per cent of Israel's parliament. These two far-right extremist parties represent the settlers, making them a powerful political force within Israel.
Given these structural challenges, there is currently little appetite for resolving the Palestine question, even if the government changes. Gaza, by contrast, is viewed primarily as a humanitarian issue rather than a political problem. Addressing this humanitarian crisis is therefore an immediate imperative. An Eisenkot victory would not guarantee a resolution, but an agreement on Gaza remains a possibility. A potential agreement on Gaza can be envisaged, but an immediate resolution of the broader Palestine question remains difficult to envisage.
Manikranth Chakravarthula:
In your analysis of the US campaign against Iran, you pointed out that Washington has exhausted its coercive toolkit while Iran maintains 'escalation dominance' and counter-escalation options. What structural miscalculation led the US into this stalemate?
Dr Stanly Johny:
The structural miscalculation was the assumption by Donald Trump and the Israelis that they could achieve their objectives within a few days. It is now documented that when Trump asked then-British Prime Minister Keir Starmer for assistance, Starmer replied that he would need to discuss it with his cabinet and get back to him on Monday. The war had begun on Saturday morning, and Trump told Starmer not to bother, saying that by the time the cabinet met, the war would be over. Instead, it has dragged on for nearly eight months without resolution.
Washington entered this conflict with four explicit objectives: dismantling Iran’s nuclear facilities, destroying its ballistic missile capabilities, terminating Iranian support for Hamas, the Houthis, Hashd al-Shaabi, and Hezbollah, and orchestrating regime change. Regime change was the keystone of the entire war plan. Without a pliable, compliant government in Tehran, none of the other three objectives are attainable because no sovereign Iranian government will voluntarily dismantle its missile deterrence to placate Washington.
Iran anticipated this. A post-facto analysis reveals that Tehran’s response rested on three strategic pillars:
1. Regime Preservation: Recognizing that decapitation was Washington’s core objective, Tehran prioritized structural continuity. When Ayatollah Khamenei was killed, the transition to Mojtaba Khamenei was swift, bringing the IRGC to center stage to lead the war effort. The Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) had already been activated for wartime contingencies. Even after Ali Larijani, who was effectively steering policy rather than President Pezeshkian was assassinated on March 17, he was immediately replaced by Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr, an official closely aligned with Mohsen and Mojtaba. The institutional structure held: the SNSC runs the state apparatus, while the IRGC prosecutes the war. Despite extreme hostilities, the regime prevented internal collapse.
2. Regionalizing the war: Rather than confining the conflict to a localized exchange with Israel, Iran turned American forward-operating bases into strategic vulnerabilities. On February 28, their initial response was to strike the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain, systematically expanding the theater across the region.
3. Weaponizing geography: In an asymmetric conflict against the world’s preeminent superpower and a heavily militarized, nuclear-armed Israel, Iran used regional chokepoints to compensate for its conventional disadvantage. By closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran leveraged geography to drive up global economic costs and impose sustained pain on Washington.
The Achilles’ heel of the US strategy was that the entire campaign was predicated on rapid regime collapse expecting an outcome where Trump could claim victory and exit, as he attempted in Venezuela. Washington and Tel Aviv had no viable contingency for an adversary that refused to fall. After 40 days of sustained bombing between February 28 and April 8, the US exhausted its targetable military assets without altering the political balance.
Threats by Trump to escalate against Iran’s civilian power grid, refineries, and energy infrastructure run directly into an escalation trap. Iran operates in a target-rich Persian Gulf. If the US strikes Iranian energy infrastructure, Tehran has the capability to retaliate against oil fields, refineries, desalination plants, power grids, and airports across the Gulf. Small Gulf sheikdoms, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait rely heavily on foreign expatriate labor and are acutely vulnerable to socioeconomic collapse if the conflict spirals out of control. Washington and the Gulf capitals are well aware of this vulnerability, which effectively checkmated American options.
Having failed to force regime change through air power while Iran retains retaliatory strike capacity, Washington has shifted from rapid military escalation to economic strangulation. By combining intensified sanctions with a naval blockade across the Gulf of Oman, Trump is attempting to squeeze Tehran into submission at the negotiating table. Given the resilience of the Iranian command structure and its counter-escalation levers, that strategy is highly unlikely to work.
Samraksha Mukund:
The US demand under Clause 6 under the 20-point plan: decommissioning of Hamas's weapons, including "light arms" collides with a globalized supply network including domestic manufacturing, state sponsorship and black-market transshipments tracing back to "revisionist" regimes like Iran, Russia and North Korea. This could also be indicative of a broader geopolitical proxy friction. How realistic is it for a US-led diplomatic framework to actualize complete disarmament when the underlying supply lines are driven by non-democratic global powers?
Dr Stanly Johny:
The assistance being sent to Gaza could be used by Hamas. In the past, Hamas obtained weapons through the Rafah corridor and from Egypt, to a certain extent. The Rafah corridor is now controlled by Egypt, while the crossing is controlled by Israel. Iran is unlikely to be in a position to send weapons to Hamas anymore. This is also why Hamas has agreed to disarm and relinquish its heavy weaponry.
Returning to the central issue, Hamas may be willing to give up its heavy weaponry and become part of a broader Palestinian security framework only if Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza. If this does not happen, Hamas may continue to operate as a security nuisance for Israeli troops.
The Trump proposal could have a positive impact, but only if both sides honour their respective commitments: Hamas must relinquish its weapons and power, and Israel must withdraw its troops from Gaza. Hamas has agreed to the proposal, but Israel has not. Whether Israel eventually accepts this framework remains to be seen.
Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis are all Iran-aligned groups, just as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq are aligned with the United States. The latter groups are not usually described as American proxies, whereas Hezbollah is often referred to as an Iranian proxy. Although these organisations maintain close relationships with Iran, they also retain autonomy in pursuing their own interests.
The question, therefore, is why Iran supports Hamas. This support is not driven solely by the objective of fighting the United States in the region. Iran's backing of the Palestinians serves two distinct nationalist objectives. First, Iran regards Israel as its principal adversary in the region. By supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran seeks to maintain pressure points in its broader security competition with Israel. Second, Iran uses this support to build influence among the wider Muslim population in West Asia. Iran is a Shia-majority country and is often accused of acting as a sectarian Shia power, while Palestinians are predominantly Sunni. By supporting the Palestinians and Hamas, Iran seeks to project a narrative that transcends the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide and positions the country as a defender of the Ummah, or the global Muslim community.
Iran therefore uses its regional allies, and proxy conflicts form part of this strategy. However, proxy groups must also be understood as autonomous actors. The powers that support them have their own nationalist interests and strategic objectives, which influence these relationships.
About the interviewers:
Akshath Kaimal, Brighty Ann Sarah, Lekshmi MK, and Preetha Renganarayanan are Research Assistants at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
Kumari Gargi is an Undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy at St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru.
Masoomi Santosh Nevgi is an Undergraduate student at the Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy at St. Joseph's University, Bengaluru.
Manikranth Chakravarthula is a doctoral student at the Conflict Resolution and Peace Research Programme, School of Conflict and Security Studies, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru.
Samraksha Mukund is an undergraduate student at the Department of International Studies, Political Science, and History at CHRIST (Deemed to be University).
